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We evaluate the effects of academic achievement awards for first and second-year college students
on a Canadian commuter campus. The award scheme offered linear cash incentives for course grades
above 70. Awards were paid every term. Program participants also had access to peer advising by
upperclassmen. Program engagement appears to have been high but overall treatment effects were
small. The intervention increased the number of courses graded above 70 and points earned above
70 for second-year students, but there was no significant effect on overall GPA. Results are somewhat
stronger for a subsample that correctly described the program rules. We argue that these results fit
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As many as 40 percent of U.S. and 30 percent of Canadian undergraduates have yet to 
finish college six years after matriculating (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010, 
Grayson and Grayson, 2003). These delays, which are typically due to a failure to meet academic 
degree requirements, may be both privately and socially costly. Struggling students pay a higher 
cost in foregone earnings, while those who fail to complete a degree program forgo the benefit of 
any possible “sheepskin effects.” Time on campus is also subsidized in public colleges and 
universities, so repeated course failures and long completion times are costly for taxpayers. 
In an effort to boost their student’ grades, most universities deploy an array of support 
services. There is little credible evidence that these efforts justify their cost. A randomized trial 
discussed by Scrivener and Weiss (2009) finds that campus support services generate small 
improvements in grades and reduce student attrition, but Angrist, Lang, and Oreopoulos (2009) 
and MacDonald, Bernstein, and Price (2009) find virtually no effect from remedial services. Part 
of the problem seems to be that take-up rates for most services are low. On the other hand, results 
from recent evaluations by Scrivener, Sommo, and Collado (2009) and Bettinger and Long 
(2009) suggest mandatory remedial services can benefit college freshman at risk of dropping out.  
In a parallel effort, motivated in part by the mixed results for support services alone, 
researchers and policy-makers have experimented with financial incentives for college 
achievement. Merit scholarships for high achievers have long been a feature of college life, but 
most merit scholarship recipients are, by definition, students who could be expected to do 
reasonably well with or without scholarship support. Financial awards for weaker students have 
traditionally been need-based, and performance-based awards for weak students are a relatively 
new development. In a series of randomized trials, Angrist et al. (2009), Cha and Patel (2010), 
MacDonald et al. (2009), and Barrow et al. (2010) studied the impact of large merit scholarships 
tied to college GPA thresholds in the B-C grade range. These studies find that merit scholarships 
had positive effects on academic performance, especially when combined with extra academic 
support services. However, these improvements were short-lived and concentrated in subgroups, 
so that the overall effects are modest.
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1  Georgia Hope and a host of similar state programs award scholarships to students with a high school GPA of B or 
better (see, e.g., Dynarski, 2004). See also Garibaldi et al. (2007), who report faster degree completion by Italian 
women in response to gradually increasing tuition payments and Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw 
(2003), who find mixed effects of small financial incentives for Dutch university students.   3
Randomized trials and quasi-experimental evaluations of financial incentives have been 
more encouraging for elementary and secondary students than for college students. Here too, 
however, student responses often appear to be limited to subgroups of the population under 
study. Studies showing substantial positive effects on elementary and secondary school students 
include Angrist et al. (2002), Henry and Rubinstein (2002), Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton 
(2009), Angrist and Lavy (2009), Deardon et al. (2009), Dee (2009), and Pallais (2009). Other 
recent experimental studies have generated less reason for optimism about the promise of 
incentives in schools: the randomized trials described by Bettinger (2008), Sharma (2010), and 
Fryer (2010) show little effect of an array of awards on achievement for elementary and middle 
school students in a wide variety of settings, and Rodriguez-Planas (2010) reports negative long-
run effects of financial incentives for high school men. 
This paper reports on the “Opportunity Knocks” (OK) experiment, an award program 
piloted at a large Canadian commuter university. The setting is similar to non-flagship campuses 
in American state systems. First and second-year students who applied for financial aid were 
offered the chance to participate in the program. Those who agreed were randomly assigned to 
treatment and control groups. Treated students earned $100 for each class in which they attained 
a grade of 70 or better and an additional $20 for each percentage point above 70 percent. A 
student with a full-course load scoring 75 in every course qualified for $2,000 over the course of 
the school year (10  ($100 + (5  20))). Randomly assigned peer advisors, upper-class students 
who had been trained to provide advice about study strategies, time management, and university 
bureaucracy, also contacted participants. The OK program structure was developed in view of the 
results from an earlier evaluation on a similar campus, the Student Achievement and Retention 
(STAR) project (Angrist, et al., 2009). STAR offered three interventions, the most successful of 
which combined financial incentives with academic support services. In the hopes of boosting 
motivation further, the OK award threshold was chosen to be attainable for most students 
(subject to a budget constraint). We opted for a partially linear payout scheme on theoretical 
grounds (see, e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1987). 
OK awards were generous; high achievers could earn up to $700 per class. Almost 90 
percent of OK participants had some kind of interaction with peer advisors and/or the program 
web site. On balance, however, the experimental results were disappointing. Second year 
students who were offered incentives earned about 13 percent more than expected based on the   4
distribution of control-group grades, suggesting the program had an incentive effect. The 
strongest effects appear around the award threshold, where the number of payment-qualifying 
courses increased, especially among students who appeared to understand the program well. But 
these gains did not translate into substantially and significantly higher GPAs. There is also little 
evidence of any impact on academic outcomes measured one year later. 
 
The following section describes the OK campus setting, program rules, and our random-
assignment research design. Section III covers descriptive statistics and reports on indicators of 
program engagement. Section IV discusses the experimental results, which show that treated 
second year students earned more in award payments than would have been expected in the 
absence of an incentive effect. OK also increased the number of second-year courses graded 
above 70 and grade points earned above 70, but these effects were not large enough to generate a 
significant increase in students’ overall GPAs. Section V reports on participants’ impressions of 
the program as revealed in post-program surveys. The paper concludes in Section VI. 
 
II. Background and Research Design 
OK was implemented on an Ontario commuter campus affiliated with a large public 
university in the fall of 2008. The six-year completion rate on this campus is about 73 percent. 
There are about 2,500 students in an entering class. In late summer of 2008, we invited 1,056 
first years and 1,073 second years to participate in OK. Eligible students are those who had 
requested financial aid, had an email address, had a high school GPA recorded in the university 
administrative information system, and had enrolled for at least 1.5 credits (half of a full load) in 
the fall semester. Invitees who completed the intake survey and gave consent were eligible for 
random assignment. Of the 1,271 students who completed the survey and were eligible, 400 were 
treated. Treatment assignment was stratified by year (first and second) and sex, with 100 in each 
group. Within sex-year cells, assignment was stratified by high school GPA quartile, with 25 in 
each group (the analysis below controls for strata). 
The OK intervention combined incentives with academic support services. This was 
motivated by the fact that a combination of incentives and services appeared to be especially 
effective in the earlier STAR evaluation, which ran in a similar setting. The services delivered 
through STAR were more elaborate and expensive, however. STAR included the opportunity to 
participate in facilitated study groups as well as email-based peer mentoring, while OK services   5
consisted of email-based peer-mentoring only. We opted for email because the take-up rate for 
facilitated study groups was low.  Also, because a number of STAR participants saw the awards 
as essentially out of reach, OK award rates were designed to be much higher. OK awards were 
also paid out more frequently, in this case, every term. Unlike STAR, the OK population 
consisted only of students that had applied for financial aid prior to the start of the school year. 
This was partly in response to political constraints but it also seemed likely that the aid 
population might be most responsive to the opportunity to earn additional awards. 
OK participants earned $100 for each class in which they received a 70 percent grade, 
and an additional $20 for each percentage point above 70.
2  For example, a student who earned a 
75 in each of five classes over one semester (five classes constitute a full load) would have 
received 5 × (100 + (5 × 20)) = $1,000. We focused on grades near 70 because anything worse is 
typically seen as unsatisfactory and because awards for lower levels of achievement are likely to 
be prohibitively expensive (a GPA of at least C- is required for graduation; this translates to a 
percentage grade in the low 60s).  In an effort to gauge our subjects’ understanding of program 
rules, we asked those eligible for random assignment to apply the award formula to hypothetical 
grades. Most calculated the award values correctly (those who responded incorrectly received a 
clarification by email).  
The services component of OK matched all treated students with (trained and paid) same-
sex peer advisors. Peer advisors were enthusiastic upper-year students or recent graduates with 
good grades. Each peer advisor covered 50 participants. Advisors emailed advisees once every 
two to three weeks, whether or not the advisees responded. These emails offered advice on 
upcoming academic events and workshops and guidance relevant for key periods in the academic 
calendar, such as midterms and finals. Advisors also provided information about OK 
scholarships, including reminders of the scholarship calculation and payment schedules. 
Advisors invited their clients to turn to them for help with any academic or personal issues that 
seemed relevant to academic success. 
 
 
III. Descriptive Statistics and Program Response 
The data for this study come primarily from the university records containing information 
                                                 
2  Payoffs were doubled and issued in the spring for year-long courses.   6
on applicants, enrolled students, and course grades. We supplemented this with data from a 
baseline survey used to identify the population eligible for random assignment, as well as more 
descriptive focus-group style information collected from a few subjects after the experiment. 
Table 1, which presents descriptive statistics, shows that OK participants were mostly 
college students of traditional age. Control group students had average grades around 82 percent 
in high school.  Less than half of the control group spoke English as a first language, reflecting 
the relatively high proportion of immigrants on the OK host campus. About half of control group 
parents graduated from a postsecondary institution (44 percent of mothers and 53 percent of 
fathers), while nearly 80 percent of parents graduated from high school, a figure comparable to 
the Canadian average for college student parents. Table 1 also documents the fact that random 
assignment successfully balanced the background characteristics of those in the treatment and 
control groups (as evidenced by insignificant effects in the “Treatment Difference” columns).  
Although not documented in the table, student course selection as measured by difficulty or 
subject area is also well balanced between treatment and control groups (random assignment 
occurred after students had pre-registered for courses).   
The OK intake survey, included in the packet describing the program to those eligible for 
random assignment, included two questions meant to gauge subjects’ understanding of program 
award rules. The first asked students to calculate the award amount for one class, and the second 
asked them to calculate the total award amount from five classes. Two-thirds of the students 
answered the second question correctly, and over 80 percent answered the first question 
correctly, facts also documented in Table 1. In the program analysis, we look at treatment effects 
for the entire sample and for those who answered the second assessment question correctly to see 
if those who understood the scholarship formula also had a stronger program response. 
Student involvement with OK was high. This can be seen in Table 2, which shows that 
about 73 percent of treated students checked their scholarship earnings on the program website. 
Women were nine points more likely to check than men. Only 38 percent of treated participants 
sent an email to their assigned peer advisor in the fall, but this number increased to 50 percent in 
the spring. By years end, 70 percent had emailed an advisor at least once over the course of the 
year. First year students and women were more likely to contact advisors than were second year 
students and men. At least eighty-six percent of treated students made some kind of program 
contact: they emailed a peer advisor, checked scholarship earnings, or emailed program staff.   7
Following a presentation of intention-to-treat effects, we discuss two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
estimates of treatment effects using a dummy for any program contact as the endogenous 
variable. The idea here is that subjects who made no contact of any kind are unlikely to have 
been affected by treatment, so any impact must driven by the subpopulation that did make 
contact. 2SLS estimates the effect of treatment on the treated in this case.  
 
IV. Program Effects 
A. Main Findings 
  A natural starting point for our analysis is a comparison of the amount earned by the 
experimental group with the earnings that students in the control group would have been entitled 
to had they been in the program. A large program effect should be reflected in larger-than 
expected earnings, where expected earnings are measured using the grade distribution in the 
control sample.
 3 Our estimates of earnings and other effects come from regressions like this one: 
 y ij = αj + βTi + δ’Xi + εij,  (1) 
where yij is the outcome for student i in stratum j, the αj are strata effects, Ti is a treatment 
assignment indicator, and Xi is a vector of additional controls.
4  Causal effects of the OK 
program are captured by β. Since treatment is randomly assigned, covariates are unnecessary to 
reduce omitted variables bias in the estimated treatment effects.  Models with covariates may, 
however, generate more precise estimates. 
The OK program had no impact on earnings for first-year men and women, a result that 
can be seen in columns 1, 4, and 7 of Table 3. On the other hand, there is some evidence of 
higher-than-expected earnings for second-year treated students, especially second-year men. The 
estimated effect on second year men in the spring term, reported in column 5, is a significant 170 
dollars. Estimates over the course of the year are about 255 dollars for men and 180 dollars for 
all second years. Both of these estimates are at least marginally significant and amount to 15-20 
percent of a standard deviation of hypothetical control group earnings.
5  
                                                 
3  Ashenfelter and Plant (1990) use a similar hypothetical payment outcome to measure the labor supply effects of 
exposure to a negative income tax. 
4   Additional controls include parental education, an indicator for English mother tongue, and indicators for 
students who answered scholarship formula questions correctly. 
5  Restricting the fall and spring samples to be the same as the full-year sample generates effects for the full year 
equal to the sum of the fall and spring effects. Estimated effects for the full year need not equal the sum (or 
average) of the two semester effects because the full-year sample differs slightly from the sample for either 
semester alone.   8
The question of whether the OK program caused more complex distributional shifts in 
hypothetical earnings is explored in Figure 1, which shows treatment and control earnings 
distributions in separate panels by sex and year. The only (marginally) significant distributional 
contrast in the figure is for second year men (using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). On the other 
hand, the contrast by treatment status for second year women looks similar to that for men. For 
both men and women, treatment seems to have shifted second year earnings from below a level 
around 1,500 to more than 1,500 dollars. The shift emerges roughly one hundred dollars above 
mean earnings for controls. 
The evidence for an effect on average grades (measured on a 0-100 scale) and GPA is 
weaker than that for earnings. The grades results appear in Table 4a and the GPA results appear 
in Table 4b. Average grades for second-year men increased by about 2.5 percentage points in the 
spring but this estimate is only marginally significant, and it’s the only significant result in the 
table. The corresponding GPA effect amounts to about 0.27 GPA points, an estimate significant at 
the 5 percent level.
6  
The earnings gains documented in Table 3 are necessarily explained by increases in the 
number of courses graded at least 70 and grade points over 70. Table 5 reports full-year program 
effects on each of these components of the scholarship award formula. Panel A shows effects on 
the number of courses in which a student earned a grade of at least 70. Treatment appears to have 
increased the number of over-70 grades awarded to second year men by almost a full course. The 
number of over-70 courses increases by about half a course for all second years. These estimates 
are reasonably precise. On the other hand, the estimated effects on grade points earned over 70 
are not estimated very precisely. The only (marginally) significant point gain is for all second 
years, an effect of 6.2 percentage points. It’s also worth noting, however, that the magnitudes 
come out such that effects on total earnings are equally distributed between a threshold effect at 
70 and awards for points over 70. 
We looked for additional evidence of effects concentrated around the award threshold. 
The results of this investigation are reported in Figure 2 in the form of treatment effects on 
indicators for grade>c, where c runs from 60-80 (these plots also show the control grade 
distribution). This investigation uncovers no evidence of an increased likelihood of crossing any 
                                                 
6  GPA is not a linear transformation of average grades, so we expect slight differences in results. Effects on GPA 
should be more similar to effects on earnings, since GPA also jumps at 70 percent.   9
threshold for first years. Treatment appears to have increased the likelihood second-year women 
earned a grade of 72-74, a series of effects concentrated around the minimum award threshold. 
Effects concentrated around the threshold may be evidence of strategic grade-seeking behavior 
on the part of treated students. For example, students who earned a 69 may have made a special 
effort (through negotiation or extra work) to clear 70. On the other hand, treatment appears to 
have boosted the grades of second-year men over a wide interval running from 60-75 percent. 
This pattern of effects weighs against a purely strategic view of the incentive response, at least 
among men.  
Although most students appeared to understand the OK program rules and award 
formula, a non-trivial minority did not. Those who misunderstood the formula linking grades and 
awards seem less likely to have been motivated by the awards. We therefore report estimates for 
a sample restricted to participants who correctly applied the OK earnings formula to an example 
in the baseline survey. Two-thirds of the sample evaluated the example correctly. Estimates 
limited to this sample are reported in Table 6, which shows full-year estimates for the same 
dependent variables covered by Tables 3 through 5. 
Estimates in the restricted sample show larger program effects on earnings than the 
estimates computed using the full sample. Specifically, earnings gains are estimated to have been 
370 for second year men and 245 for all second years, both significant at the 5 percent level. On 
the other hand, neither GPA nor grade effects are significantly different from zero. The apparent 
difference in findings for grades and earnings is explained by the last two rows of Table 6, which 
reports estimates for the components of the award formula in the restricted sample. These 
estimates show reasonably clear effects on the number of courses above 70 with weaker effects 
on points earned above. The shift in grades around the 70 percent threshold was apparently 
inadequate to boost overall GPA by a statistically significant amount. 
Given the modest program effects observed during the treatment period, it seems unlikely 
that OK boosted achievement substantially in the longer-run. This conjecture is confirmed in 
Table 7, which reports full-sample treatment effects for fall 2009 (the semester after the program 
ended). The results in Table 7 show marginally significant positive effects on average grades and 
GPA for first year women and in the pooled sample of first years (who are second years in the 
post-treatment period), but these effects are small. The post-program outcomes also offer a 
specification test for the analysis above, since we would not expect to see threshold effects   10
around 70 percent in the post-program period. There is no evidence of a treatment effect on the 
number of fall 2009 courses graded at or above 70 percent.
7 
 
B. Additional Results 
We might expect OK incentives to be more powerful for financially constrained students. 
But treatment effects come out similar in subgroups defined by expected financial aid and 
whether students expressed concerns about funding.  Effects are somewhat larger in the 
subsample of students whose parents had not been to college than among those with college-
educated parents, but the gap by parents’ schooling is not large or precisely estimated. 
The effects of program assignment reported in Tables 3 to 7 are diluted by non-
compliance, that is, by the fact that some of those assigned to treatment did not really participate 
in the program. It’s therefore worth estimating the effect of treatment on participants. The 
decision to engage with the program is not randomly assigned; this is a choice made by those 
offered the opportunity to participate. However, we can use the randomly assigned offer of OK 
treatment as an instrument for program take-up. By virtue of random assignment the OK offer is 
unrelated to characteristics of eligible students. The OK offer is also highly correlated with 
participation status: As shown in Table 2, 86 percent of those offered OK were engaged in some 
way, while no one in the control group had access to OK awards or services. The overall first 
stage effect of OK offers on participation is therefore around 0.86. Moreover, because no one in 
the control group participated, 2SLS estimates in this case capture the effect of participation on 
program participants, as described in Angrist and Pischke (2009, Section 4.4.3). Effects on 
program participants are of interest because they give a kind of theoretical upper bound on 
program effects for this particular intervention. These estimates tell us how much achievement 
was boosted for those who responded to incentives in some measurable way. 
The first stage effect of OK offers on participation rates is between 0.84 and 0.9 in the 
full sample and between 0.86 and 0.92 in the subsample that appears to have understood OK 
program rules. The first-stage estimates appear in the first row of each panel in Table 8, which 
also reports 2SLS estimates of the effect of participation on participants. Adjusting reduced-form 
offer effects (i.e., the estimates of program effects reported in Tables 3-6) for non-compliance 
                                                 
7   Roughly 100 program participants dropped out between the first and second years. Dropout rates were similar in 
the treatment and control groups.   11
necessarily leads to somewhat larger treatment effects, in this case larger by about 10-20 percent.  
The most impressive effects in Table 8 are for the number of courses in which students 
earned a grade above 70. Here, effects on second years in the full sample are on the order of two-
thirds of a course, while the gains among those who understood the program well amount to 
almost a full course (an estimate of 0.91 with a standard error of 0.33, reported at the bottom of 
column 8). The last column of Table 8 shows a marginally significant effect on the number of 
courses in which students earned at least 70 among all students who understood the program well 
(i.e., pooling men and women, and first and second years). The effect for all men is also 
significant at the 5 percent level in this sample, with a marginally significant impact on second-
year women. A robust and substantial impact on hypothetical earnings and points above 70 also 
emerges from the 2SLS estimates in Panel B. At the same time, neither the earnings effects nor 
the increase in the number of courses graded above 70 translated into higher overall average 
grades among participants. 
 
V. Student Impressions 
The OK sign-up survey asked students to predict their average grades in two scenarios, 
one as an OK participant and one as a non-participant. To encourage a thoughtful response to this 
question, we offered those who answered the opportunity to win a $500 prize to be given to the 
student whose predictions came closest to the mark. About 60 percent predicted the same grade 
either way and the average predicted effect on grades was about 2.2 points. This is considerably 
larger than most of the effects reported in Tables 6 and 8.  It also seems noteworthy that those 
who predicted a positive response do not appear to have responded more strongly than those who 
predicted no effect.  
After the program ended, we asked students who predicted no effect in the intake survey 
why they had expected this. Of the 226 emails sent to treated participants predicting no effect, 
only 34 responded. Most of these respondents said they were planning to do as well as possible 
either way. For example, one said: “Before starting courses, I had already decided that I would 
do my best. And so, I felt a scholarship would be an added motivation, but fundamentally it came 
down to my own ability and commitment.” Two thought the award was too remote, commenting: 
“I predicted the program would have no effect because it provides a long-term reward for regular 
short-term behavior (daily intense studying).” Only 3 respondents said the incentives were too   12
small. One said OK was “not too catchy and/or something worth dying for.” Another mentioned 
the 70 percent threshold: “I believe the cash reward for each course was not high enough per 
percentage point above 70 percent. If the cash reward was perhaps 30 or 40 dollars per percent 
point above 70 percent, I would've worked even harder.”   
We also surveyed a random sample of 50 students from the treatment group at the end of 
the school year (May 13, 2009), offering $25 movie gift certificates to those who responded. 
Among the 30 respondents to this survey, 27 said the scholarships motivated them. Some thought 
the program was very effective.  For example, one respondent commented: “Every time I began 
to lose interest in a particular course, I would remind myself that I just need to well . . . keep with 
it; the rewards will be tremendous. A scholarship is one such reward . . . and it sure is helpful, as 
it lifts a lot of the financial burdens I’m faced with when it comes to paying tuition & other fees.” 
Others saw the program was somewhat effective, as in this comment: “This scholarship did 
affect my motivation to study at some point . . .” Respondents often cited concerns about tuition 
and fees as a motivating factor that boosted their interest in OK.  
  Half of the post-program treated respondents felt the program led them to study more, 
though some felt their opportunity for more study time was limited. This comment was typical: 
“The program made me study more, but not much. I usually follow my schedule between work 
and school. So the amount of time I could have spent on study is somehow limited.” Others felt 
the program helped them focus on schoolwork: “As someone who gets sidetracked easily, I kept 
it in mind that staying focused would pay off in more than one way, and so yes, it did affect the 
amount of time I devoted to studying”. Another said, “I think what’s great about the program is 
that when you feel like you’re beginning to procrastinate, you think about the outcome of this 
program and want to get back to studying.” On the other hand, one second year student reporting 
feeling somewhat demoralized by OK: “I did abnormally poor this year compared to my usual 
standards and it just so happened to coincide with Opportunity Knocks. The money reminder just 
kind of made me feel ‘worse’ about myself.” 
  Among those who responded to the post-program follow-up survey, almost all felt the 
program improved their academic performance. Some appreciated the opportunity to earn 
scholarships for good but not necessarily outstanding grades: “Personally, I don’t find that [the 
university] offers as many scholarship opportunities as other [universities], so I think it was 
rewarding to know that my academic performance was acknowledged and rewarded.” Some felt   13
they increased performance out of financial concerns: “[E]specially now with the economic 
downfall, it is extremely difficult to muster up the finances to help pay for tuition without relying 
on OSAP [financial aid]. I kind of looked at Opportunity Knocks as my employer who gives me 
more money the better I performed in my studies.” One student volunteered the view that the 
program would have a long-lasting effect on him/her: “The program had significantly improved 
my grades! And I cannot wait to see what I can accomplish next year.”  
Everyone we contacted afterwards reported that they received peer advisor e-mails about 
once or twice a month. All but one of the respondents said the advisor e-mails were helpful. One 
noted, “I think the advisor made good decisions between sending us important reminders and 
information without being redundant. It was especially important to receive the e-mails about the 
scholarship money quickly after marks were sent in.” Another said, “I find it very useful that 
someone was actually helping me through school.” All but one respondent felt the program was 
worth continuing. Virtually everyone seemed grateful for having being selected for OK. One 
respondent closed with this endorsement: 
The OK Program has been an essential part of my student experience, and in many 
ways crucial to my academic performance. I think that having a peer advisor as 
opposed to just the regular counselors working in the University is very important. 
With all the stress that universities cause their students – financially or otherwise, 
it's really nice to know there is a program like Opportunity Knocks to help students 
every step of the way. 
 
Overall, this feedback leaves us feeling that most treated students were aware of and engaged 
with OK, and that a large minority expected some benefit. Others who thought the program 
would have little effect seem to feel this way because they were already anxious to succeed and 
willing to devote time to their studies.  
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
The OK program was popular with participants: sign-up rates and program engagement 
were high, and in follow-up focus group interviews many program participants were enthusiastic 
about the experience. At the same time, overall program effects on achievement were modest. 
Treated second-year students earned more in OK scholarship money than we would have 
expected based on the control-group grade distribution, increased the number of courses in which 
they earned a grade of 70, and gained a few grade points above 70. This localized response to the   14
large program incentive to earn a grade of 70 percent did not translate into a substantial boost in 
overall achievement, but it was noticeably stronger in the subsample of students who appear to 
have understood the award scheme well.  
The past decade has seen a growing number of randomized evaluations of pay-for-
performance schemes for students at various levels. Table 9 summarizes studies using 
randomized designs to look at financial incentives in college.
8  A number of these studies show 
effects on credits earned in response to incentives for course completion and grade thresholds 
(Barrow et al., 2010, Cha and Patel, 2010, and MacDonald et al., 2009). These results, along 
with the findings in Angrist et al. (2009) and those reported here, suggest that students react to 
threshold targets more strongly than to marginal incentives beyond the initial target. Incentives 
also seem to be more effective when combined with academic support services. Overall, 
however, the picture that emerges from the research summarized in Table 9 is one of mostly 
modest effects.  In particular, overall GPA seems largely unaffected except in some subgroups, 
and Angrist et al. (2009) is the only randomized evaluation to date to find college achievement 
effects persisting into the post-treatment period. It’s also worth noting that the OK demonstration 
failed to replicate the strong positive results for women seen in the earlier experiment. 
One explanation for the muted effectiveness of merit scholarships may be that poor 
performing students have trouble developing effective study strategies. For example, Israeli high 
school students have easy access to test-focused remedial study sessions in public school, a fact 
that may explain some of the stronger Angrist and Lavy (2009) results on achievement awards 
for high school girls. Fryer (2010) similarly argues that incentives for learning (in his case, 
reading books) look more promising than pay for performance on achievement tests. These 
intriguing results come from elementary and secondary school settings. Investigation of the 
merits of as-yet-untried recipes combining learning incentives with academic support schemes 
seems a worthy priority for future research on college achievement.  
                                                 
8   The studies listed in this table use random assignment to evaluate financial incentives for college students.  This 
list is the result of a citation search (that is, citing studies we were previously aware of) and a keyword search 































Age 18.2 -0.105 19.2 0.011 18.4 0.014 19.2 0.069 18.7 -0.012
[0.608] (0.056)* [0.514] (0.056) [0.815] (0.104) [0.460] (0.070) [0.757] (0.036)
High school 82.8 0.145 82.4 0.302 82.3 -0.344 82.1 -0.387 82.5 -0.024
grade average [6.56] (0.238) [6.19] (0.217) [6.44] (0.310) [6.73] (0.338) [6.44] (0.134)
1st language 0.404 0.057 0.426 -0.046 0.479 -0.060 0.333 0.097 0.416 0.009
is English [0.491] (0.056) [0.495] (0.057) [0.501] (0.065) [0.474] (0.069) [0.493] (0.031)
Mother a college 0.395 0.065 0.477 -0.016 0.479 0.050 0.424 -0.034 0.439 0.020
graduate [0.490] (0.056) [0.500] (0.058) [0.501] (0.065) [0.497] (0.070) [0.496] (0.031)
Father a college 0.479 0.051 0.581 0.009 0.603 0.047 0.475 0.105 0.532 0.049
graduate [0.500] (0.057) [0.494] (0.058) [0.491] (0.063) [0.502] (0.071) [0.499] (0.031)
Correctly answered harder 0.616 0.022 0.690 -0.010 0.719 -0.080 0.697 0.002 0.666 -0.014
question on scholarship formula [0.487] (0.053) [0.464] (0.054) [0.451] (0.061) [0.462] (0.065) [0.472] (0.029)
Controls who would have earned 0.883 0.968 0.908 0.978 0.923
some scholarship money [0.322] [0.177] [0.289] [0.148] [0.266]
Hypothetical earnings 1,240 1,390 1,430 1,400 1,330
for controls [1,220] [1,090] [1,230] [1,270] [1,190]
Observations
F test for joint significance
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance by Gender and Year
Women Men Whole Sample
First Years Second Years First Years Second Years
1271
1.11 0.453 0.858 1.43 0.515
449 377 246 199
{0.797}
Notes: “Control Mean” columns report averages and standard deviations for variables in the left-most column, within the relevant gender-year subgroup. "Treatment
Difference" columns report coefficients from regressions of each variable in the left-most column on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year in
school, and high school grade quartile). The last row presents within-column F tests of joint significance of all the treatment differences. Standard deviations for the
control group are in square brackets, robust standard errors are in parentheses, and p values for F tests are in curly braces. Some respondents did not answer the parents'
education questions. They are coded as a separate category (“missing”) and therefore are not coded as high school or college graduates.




















Emailed advisor (Fall) 0.450 0.390 0.420 0.410 0.270 0.340 0.430 0.330 0.380
Emailed advisor (Spring) 0.520 0.440 0.480 0.660 0.380 0.520 0.590 0.410 0.500
Emailed advisor (Fall and Spring) 0.790 0.700 0.745 0.750 0.560 0.655 0.770 0.630 0.700
Checked scholarship earnings online 0.760 0.780 0.770 0.650 0.710 0.680 0.705 0.745 0.725
Emailed the program website 0.270 0.320 0.295 0.250 0.300 0.275 0.260 0.310 0.285
Any contact 0.900 0.870 0.885 0.840 0.840 0.840 0.870 0.855 0.863
Observations 100 100 200 100 100 200 200 200 400
Notes: This table shows the proportion making the indicated form of program-related contact.
Table 2. Fraction of Treated Students Making Program-Related Contact by Gender and Year



















Control Mean 645 695 667 770 744 760 682 707 693
[657] [589] [628] [670] [642] [658] [663] [602] [637]
Treatment Effect -18.8 99.7 39.9 33.9 49.2 11.9 -5.73 72.0 28.0
(53.1) (60.9) (39.9) (69.8) (73.1) (51.3) (41.9) (45.9) (31.1)
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1259
Control Mean 589 711 640 644 655 649 605 696 642
[608] [598] [606] [600] [683] [633] [606] [622] [614]
Treatment Effect -57.6 24.7 -19.1 -20.0 170 35.5 -52.5 77.3 4.47
(49.4) (66.4) (39.6) (59.5) (80.7)** (49.4) (37.6) (51.0) (30.8)
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1206
Control Mean 1,240 1,390 1,300 1,430 1,400 1,420 1,290 1,390 1,330
[1,220] [1,090] [1,170] [1,230] [1,270] [1,240] [1,230] [1,140] [1,190]
Treatment Effect -80.2 165 33.0 7.01 255 54.8 -64.3 180 41.1
(95.3) (121) (74.1) (121) (144)* (95.2) (74.3) (91.3)** (58.2)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1203
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel A. Fall
Panel B. Spring
Panel C. Full Year
Notes: “Control Mean” rows list averages and standard deviations of program earnings, within the relevant gender-year subgroup. “Treatment Effect” rows report coefficients
from regressions of program earnings on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high
school grade average, whether students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Control earnings
are hypothetical; treated earnings are actual. Full year courses are double-weighted in the earnings calculation. The sample used for the full year estimates includes students
with grades in fall and spring. The fall analysis omits full year courses. If we restrict the fall and spring samples to be the same as the full year sample, then the effects for the
full year are the sum of the fall and spring effects (this is also true in later tables). Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard deviations are in square brackets.
Table 3. Effects on (Hypothetical) Program Earnings



















Control Mean 68.1 71.0 69.4 70.7 72.4 71.4 68.9 71.4 70.0
[11.6] [8.40] [10.4] [10.9] [8.39] [10.0] [11.4] [8.41] [10.3]
Treatment Effect 0.424 0.420 0.461 0.452 -0.520 -0.496 0.236 0.064 0.076
(0.945) (0.947) (0.662) (1.18) (1.07) (0.827) (0.740) (0.694) (0.515)
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1259
Control Mean 67.4 71.2 68.9 68.8 70.0 69.3 67.8 70.8 69.0
[11.3] [9.02] [10.5] [11.2] [10.6] [10.9] [11.2] [9.46] [10.6]
Treatment Effect -0.814 -0.118 -0.471 -0.971 2.54 0.106 -0.966 0.727 -0.225
(1.16) (1.13) (0.801) (1.56) (1.41)* (1.03) (0.901) (0.901) (0.634)
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1206
Control Mean 67.9 71.1 69.2 69.9 71.5 70.5 68.4 71.2 69.6
[10.7] [7.77] [9.69] [10.3] [8.59] [9.70] [10.6] [7.99] [9.70]
Treatment Effect -0.323 0.470 0.076 -0.233 1.17 -0.146 -0.458 0.614 -0.025
(0.958) (0.932) (0.662) (1.21) (1.09) (0.840) (0.745) (0.719) (0.522)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1203
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel A. Fall
Panel B. Spring
Panel C. Full Year
Notes: “Control Mean” rows list averages and standard deviations of average grades, within the relevant gender-year subgroup. “Treatment Effect” rows report coefficients
from regressions of average grades on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade
average, whether students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Average grades are on a 100
point scale. Full year courses are double-weighted in the average grade calculation. The sample used for the full year estimates includes students with grades in fall and
spring. The fall analysis omits full year courses. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard deviations are in square brackets.
Table 4a. Effects on Average Grades



















Control Mean 2.39 2.64 2.50 2.61 2.75 2.66 2.46 2.67 2.55
[0.982] [0.765] [0.900] [0.920] [0.743] [0.856] [0.968] [0.760] [0.890]
Treatment Effect 0.021 0.046 0.038 0.046 -0.039 -0.034 0.014 0.015 0.009
(0.079) (0.081) (0.056) (0.103) (0.098) (0.073) (0.063) (0.061) (0.044)
N 444 374 818 246 195 441 690 569 1259
Control Mean 2.34 2.64 2.47 2.47 2.54 2.50 2.38 2.61 2.48
[0.916] [0.783] [0.875] [0.935] [0.880] [0.912] [0.922] [0.810] [0.885]
Treatment Effect -0.049 0.018 -0.016 -0.003 0.266 0.071 -0.037 0.102 0.022
(0.081) (0.090) (0.059) (0.106) (0.119)** (0.079) (0.064) (0.073) (0.048)
N 441 340 781 242 183 425 683 523 1206
Control Mean 2.37 2.64 2.49 2.55 2.67 2.59 2.42 2.65 2.52
[0.895] [0.689] [0.825] [0.870] [0.739] [0.822] [0.890] [0.702] [0.825]
Treatment Effect -0.021 0.055 0.018 0.019 0.126 0.021 -0.019 0.075 0.019
(0.073) (0.079) (0.053) (0.096) (0.097) (0.070) (0.058) (0.061) (0.042)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1203
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel A. Fall
Panel B. Spring
Panel C. Full Year
Notes: “Control Mean” rows list averages and standard deviations of GPA, within the relevant gender-year subgroup. “Treatment Effect” rows report coefficients from
regressions of GPA on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether
students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. GPA is on a four point scale. The sample used for
the full year estimates includes students with grades in fall and spring. The fall analysis omits full year courses. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard deviations
are in square brackets.
Table 4b. Effects on GPA



















Control Mean 4.58 5.22 4.85 5.18 5.01 5.11 4.75 5.16 4.92
[3.35] [2.84] [3.16] [3.17] [2.96] [3.08] [3.30] [2.87] [3.14]
Treatment Effect -0.034 0.422 0.185 0.128 0.954 0.338 -0.010 0.572 0.239
(0.260) (0.335) (0.205) (0.356) (0.405)** (0.268) (0.208) (0.252)** (0.161)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1203
Control Mean 38.9 43.3 40.8 45.5 45.0 45.3 40.9 43.8 42.1
[46.2] [42.1] [44.5] [47.4] [50.4] [48.5] [46.6] [44.4] [45.7]
Treatment Effect -3.84 6.16 0.726 -0.290 7.98 1.05 -3.17 6.15 0.861
(3.76) (4.64) (2.88) (4.57) (5.49) (3.62) (2.87) (3.52)* (2.25)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1203
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Panel A. Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent
Panel B. Total Grade Percentage Points Over 70 Percent
Notes: The dependent variable in Panel A is the total number of courses in which the student received a grade at 70 percent or higher over both semesters. In Panel B, the
dependent variable is the sum of the percentage points by which the student's grades exceeded 70 percent. “Control Mean” rows list averages and standard deviations, within
the relevant gender-year subgroup. “Treatment Effect” rows report coefficients from regressions on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year in school,
and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered
questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are double-weighted in the calculation of both dependent variables. The sample used to make this table includes
students with grades in fall and spring. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; standard deviations are in square brackets.
Table 5. Effects on Components of the OK Scholarship Formula



















(Hypothetical) Program -218 219 -9.32 102 370 160 -80.4 245 63.7
Earnings (130)* (155) (101) (144) (172)** (111) (97.2) (114)** (74.8)
Average Grades -1.23 0.999 -0.161 0.839 1.73 0.754 -0.351 1.03 0.219
(1.10) (1.12) (0.779) (1.51) (1.31) (1.00) (0.913) (0.879) (0.634)
GPA -0.107 0.112 -0.002 0.123 0.167 0.103 -0.008 0.117 0.044
(0.088) (0.095) (0.064) (0.118) (0.117) (0.083) (0.072) (0.074) (0.052)
Number of Courses with -0.339 0.715 0.165 0.429 1.19 0.637 -0.008 0.813 0.353
Grade of At Least 70 Percent (0.333) (0.410)* (0.264) (0.431) (0.497)** (0.323)** (0.265) (0.309)*** (0.203)*
Total Grade Percentage -9.21 7.38 -1.29 2.97 12.6 4.82 -3.98 8.19 1.42
Points Over 70 Percent (5.25)* (5.98) (3.96) (5.37) (6.49)* (4.19) (3.81) (4.37)* (2.91)
N 274 236 510 166 127 293 440 363 803
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: “Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent” is the total number of courses in which the student received a grade at 70 percent or higher. “Total Grade Percentage
Points Over 70 Percent” is the sum of the percentage points by which the student's grades exceeded 70 percent. Each row reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated variable
on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first
language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are double-weighted in the calculation of the dependent
variables. The sample used to make this table includes students with grades in fall and spring.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 6. Full Year Effects (Students Who Calculated Awards Correctly)





























(Hypothetical) Program 7.22 60.0 33.5 77.6 22.8 36.8 22.7 54.1 33.0
Earnings (58.4) (68.7) (44.2) (73.2) (77.9) (52.7) (45.2) (51.4) (33.9)
Average Grades 1.44 0.344 0.844 1.36 -2.16 -0.448 1.35 -0.618 0.299
(0.917) (1.17) (0.736) (1.49) (1.46) (1.06) (0.803)* (0.912) (0.603)
GPA 0.148 0.019 0.082 0.083 -0.144 -0.037 0.119 -0.041 0.033
(0.079)* (0.096) (0.062) (0.127) (0.122) (0.088) (0.068)* (0.074) (0.050)
Number of Courses with 0.196 0.166 0.180 0.224 0.072 0.127 0.197 0.131 0.145
Grade of At Least 70 Percent (0.163) (0.184) (0.121) (0.226) (0.230) (0.162) (0.132) (0.141) (0.096)
Total Grade Percentage -0.620 2.17 0.776 2.76 0.782 1.21 0.152 2.05 0.921
Points Over 70 Percent (2.32) (2.69) (1.75) (2.74) (3.02) (1.99) (1.75) (2.02) (1.32)
N 395 334 729 209 165 374 604 499 1103
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: “Number of Courses with Grade of At Least 70 Percent” is the total number of courses in which the student received a grade at 70 percent or higher. “Total Grade Percentage
Points Over 70 Percent” is the sum of the percentage points by which the student's grades exceeded 70 percent. Each row reports coefficients from regressions of the indicated variable
on a treatment dummy, with sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first
language is English, parents' education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are excluded from the calculation of all five dependent
variables. “First Year” and “Second Year” continue to refer to the students' standing during the program period. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7. Effects in Fall 2009
Women Men Women and Men



















First Stage (Any Contact) 0.901 0.891 0.897 0.844 0.874 0.858 0.876 0.882 0.878
(0.029)*** (0.032)*** (0.022)*** (0.037)*** (0.035)*** (0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.017)***
Second Stages:
(Hypothetical) Program -89.0 186 36.8 8.31 292 63.9 -73.4 204 46.8
 Earnings (104) (131) (81.3) (139) (156)* (108) (83.6) (101)** (65.4)
Average Grades -0.359 0.527 0.084 -0.276 1.34 -0.171 -0.523 0.696 -0.029
(1.05) (1.02) (0.727) (1.38) (1.18) (0.956) (0.840) (0.795) (0.587)
GPA -0.023 0.062 0.020 0.023 0.144 0.024 -0.022 0.084 0.021
(0.079) (0.086) (0.058) (0.110) (0.105) (0.080) (0.065) (0.068) (0.047)
Number of Courses with -0.037 0.473 0.206 0.152 1.09 0.394 -0.011 0.648 0.272
Grade of At Least 70 Percent (0.283) (0.362) (0.225) (0.407) (0.437)** (0.304) (0.234) (0.277)** (0.180)
Total Grade Percentage -4.27 6.92 0.809 -0.344 9.14 1.22 -3.62 6.97 0.981
Points Over 70 Percent (4.11) (5.05) (3.16) (5.23) (5.96) (4.12) (3.24) (3.89)* (2.53)
N 441 339 780 242 181 423 683 520 1203
First Stage (Any Contact) 0.922 0.907 0.915 0.863 0.900 0.875 0.896 0.895 0.895
(0.033)*** (0.035)*** (0.024)*** (0.043)*** (0.037)*** (0.030)*** (0.027)*** (0.028)*** (0.019)***
Second Stages:
(Hypothetical) Program -237 241 -10.2 119 411 183 -89.8 274 71.2
 Earnings (139)* (164) (108) (158) (178)** (123) (106) (123)** (82.0)
Average Grades -1.34 1.10 -0.176 0.972 1.92 0.862 -0.392 1.15 0.245
(1.16) (1.19) (0.835) (1.66) (1.35) (1.10) (0.997) (0.950) (0.696)
GPA -0.116 0.123 -0.002 0.143 0.186 0.117 -0.008 0.130 0.049
(0.094) (0.101) (0.069) (0.129) (0.120) (0.091) (0.079) (0.080) (0.057)
Number of Courses with -0.368 0.788 0.181 0.497 1.32 0.729 -0.009 0.908 0.394
Grade of At Least 70 Percent (0.353) (0.432)* (0.282) (0.475) (0.511)** (0.356)** (0.289) (0.332)*** (0.222)*
Total Grade Percentage -9.99 8.13 -1.41 3.45 14.0 5.51 -4.44 9.15 1.59
Points Over 70 Percent (5.58)* (6.34) (4.25) (5.91) (6.71)** (4.62) (4.16) (4.73)* (3.19)
N 274 236 510 166 127 293 440 363 803
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: “First Stage (Any Contact)” rows report coefficients from a regression of a dummy variable equal to one if the student made any program-related contact (see Table 2) on a
treatment dummy. “Second Stage” rows report coefficients from IV regressions, instrumenting for the program contact dummy with the treatment dummy. All regressions also include
sampling strata controls (gender, year in school, and high school grade quartile) and controls for high school grade average, whether students' first language is English, parents'
education, and whether students answered questions on program rules correctly. Full year courses are double-weighted in the calculation of second stage dependent variables. The
sample used to make this table includes students with grades in fall and spring. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel A. Full Sample
Panel B. Students Who Calculated Awards Correctly
Table 8. IV Estimates for Participants
Women Men Women and Men
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Study Sample Treatment Outcome All Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1. GPA 0.01 -0.110 0.086
(0.066) (0.103) (0.084)
[1.81] [1.908] 1.728
Credits earned -0.012 -0.157 0.084
(0.064) (0.106) (0.082)
[2.363] [2.45] [2.988]
Incentives and support services GPA 0.210 0.084 0.267
(0.092)** (0.162) (0.117)**
1.805 1.908 1.728
Credits earned 0.092 -0.196 0.269
(0.087) [.015] (0.108)**
[2.363] [2.45] [2.988]
2. GPA -0.019 0.019 -0.021
(0.058) (0.096) (0.073)
[2.42] [2.55] [2.37]
Courses with grade of at 
least 70 percent -0.010 0.128 -0.034
(0.208) (0.356) (0.260)
[4.75] [5.18] [4.58]
GPA 0.075 0.126 0.055
(0.061) (0.097) (0.079)
[2.65] [2.67] [2.64]
Courses with grade of at 















5. Met first year requirement 0.033
(0.055)
[0.195]
Met first year requirement 0.055
(0.058)
[0.195]
6. First semester GPA 
(missing GPAs imputed) 0.08 0.12
p>0.1 p>0.1
[2.11] [2.20]
Second semester GPA 
(missing GPAs imputed) 0.12 0.14
p<0.05** p<0.05**
[1.88] [2.04]
Third semester GPA 
(missing GPAs imputed) 0.01 0.12
p>0.1 p<0.05**
[2.01] [2.16]
Notes: The table reports main baseline sample outcomes for grades and credits earned during each program period. Standard errors are in parentheses. Control means are in 
square brackets.
* significant at 10% level. ** significant at 5% level. *** significant at 1% level. See text for sources and more details. 
$750 each of three semesters for 1) 
obtaining 2.0 GPA or higher, 2) eligible to 
continue in a full program the following 
semester, and 3) completing at least 12 






$1,000 for C+ to B- first year performance, 
$5,000 for B+ to A performance (varies by 
HS grade)
Over 2 semesters and for each semester-long 
course, $100 for attaining at least 70% and 
$20 for each percentage point higher than 
this (full course load = 10 semester courses)
For each of two semesters, $250 for at least 
half-time enrollment, $250 for C-average or 
better at end of midterms, and $500 for 
maintaining C-average, plus optional 
enhanced college counseling
Angrist, Oreopoulos, 
and Williams (2010) 
[Opportunity Knocks]
First year students on financial 
aid at Canadian commuter 
university in 2008-2009
First year students at Canadian 
commuter university in 2005-
2006, except for top HS grade 
quartile
Second year students on 
financial aid at Canadian 
commuter university in 2008-
2009
Low-income parents beginning 
community college in Lousiana 
between 2004 and 2005
Barrow et al. (2010) 
[Opening Doors 
Louisiana]
~$1,500 for completion of all first year 
requirements by start of new academic year
First year economics and 
business students at the 
University of Amsterdam in 
MacDonald, 
Bernstein, and Price 
(2009) [Foundations 
for Success]
Table 9. Studies of College Achievement Awards
(sample is mostly 
female)
(sample is mostly 
female)
At-risk students beginning 
community college in Ontario, 







~$500 for completion of all first year 
requirements by start of new academic year
Leuven, Oosterbeek, 











Low-income Ohio college 
students in 2008 with children 
and eligible for TANF
$1,800 for earning a grade of C or better in 
12 or more credits, or $900 for a C or better 
in 6 to 11 credits, with payments at end of 
each semester
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First Year  Women



























First Year  Men














KS test p-value: 0.108
Treatment Control
Note: The figure plots the smoothed kernel densities of OK program earnings for the full year from fall 2008 through spring 2009. 
Control earnings are hypothetical; treated earnings are actual. Full-year courses are double-weighted in the earnings calculation. The 
sample used to make this figure includes students with grades in fall and spring.   26

















































































































































































































Treatment Effects 95 Percent Confidence Interval Control Grade Distribution
 
Note: The figure shows treatment effects on the number of courses in which students earned a grade at or above a given threshold, 
where the thresholds are plotted on the x-axis.  Control densities are kernel density plots of grades at the course level using a normal 
kernel, taking only grades between 60 and 80 percent (inclusive).  Treatment effects were estimated using the same models as for 
Table 3.   27
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